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POLICY FORUM 
Creating Incentives for Accountability in Patient Care 
William Bond, MD, MS 
 
“If we all put one of our lunch items in a pool, then we can sell them, and we’ll split 
the profit.” This must be heard in middle school lunchrooms across the country every 
year. The corporation usually lasts a few days and may end in a lunchroom brawl, 
but generally nobody dies or becomes permanently injured. As we consider the 
market for lunchroom dessert pastries, it highlights the many differences between 
health care and other goods. With pastries, we know the price on offer and the price 
if we bought the pastry at the competing corner store. We know our classmate is 
driven by the profit motive and is unlikely to share the income with his mother who 
packed the lunch. The profits are visible; the coins are easily seen, counted, and 
distributed. Thus, there is transparency in any gain sharing. 
 
Of course in health care, we as the patient are not sure we want a pastry, we’re not 
told the price of the pastry, we’re not sure if the pastry is good for us, whether 
evidence exists that the pastry is beneficial, or whether the doctor is motivated to sell 
or withhold the pastry based on our well-being or his or her profit. Additionally, the 
doctor or practice might have avoided our lunch table all together, because we’re the 
poor kids or the kids who were likely to have a bad outcome after eating the pastry. 
 
Thus in health care we have knowledge asymmetry, agency problems, lack of price 
transparency, and biased selection of patients, to name just a few issues. Adding to 
that complexity, Medicare, private insurers, and employers have now argued for 
incentives to increase care quality, decrease utilization, and improve overall 
outcomes [1]. Clearly patients, payers, and clinicians respond to incentives, and 
incentives in any system are challenging to orchestrate and can lead to distortions in 
the market. Consider the well described regional variation in health care utilization 
that is in part driven by the fee-for-service system [2, 3]. Any overly large incentive 
may distort the market or lead to unethical choices in the offering of services.  
 
Structuring Incentives Effectively for Teams and Organizations 
Here we consider the impact of an incentive distributed on a team of providers, 
rather than simply on the individual physician. For any incentive to have an impact it 
must first be understood. In an era when incentives may be tied to clinician-, group-, 
and network-level performance, this should not be taken for granted. My 
multispecialty group within an integrated delivery system recently mandated an 
online training module to explain the incentive system and its impact on physician 
and advanced practice clinician salaries. As noted in informal discussions with 
colleagues, this module was felt to be appropriate and generally appreciated by 
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clinicians. Building an understanding of incentives for team members such as 
medical assistants with lower levels of baseline education, however, poses additional 
challenges. These team members may have difficulty understanding percentages, 
holdbacks, quintiles of performance, budget trigger points, and other terminology 
routinely used to justify or withhold incentives. 
 
Without understanding, we cannot reach the goal of aligning incentives across the 
team. The focus of strategic alignment has traditionally been the relationship 
between physician incentives and those of an integrated health system [1]. However, 
within the integrated system, many team members such as nurses and medical 
assistants have key roles to play in meeting practice goals, but under current 
incentive structures receive little if any performance-based compensation. Some of 
the neglect may simply be a historical artifact of organizational structures, with 
nurses paid under a different reporting silo than doctors. Barriers may also be created 
by nursing union rules that inhibit trials of productivity-based pay or shared-risk 
models. In aggregate, more attention should be paid to incentives for other team 
members who play key roles in overall clinical productivity.  
 
This is especially worth considering because the marginal impact of an incentive for 
any actor in the health care system will depend in part on its relationship to existing 
salary and wealth. Thus, reason would suggest that a $5,000 bonus payout would be 
far more meaningful to a nurse making $60,000 than to a physician making 
$200,000. Incentives for lower-paid members of the team might actually yield 
significant productivity gains with smaller increases in cost than physician 
incentives. While executives may have 20 percent or more of their annual pay based 
on performance-based incentives, there are no authoritative guidelines or evidence 
about safe maximums or effective minimums of incentives for health care team 
members. 
 
Furthermore, practice models can be set up so that performance markers must be met 
at the individual level, group level, and health network level. Whether these markers 
function independently—that is, when the individual performance marker is hit, the 
incentive for that marker is paid—or whether they are tied triggers—so that all 
marker levels must be hit for any reward to be had—must be carefully considered. 
Linking nothing to individual performance could be very frustrating, but linking all 
incentives to higher organizational level performance could be exceptionally 
demotivating. Reward structures demanding continuous progress can also be 
demotivating—most improvements in quality or cost are likely to plateau over time, 
and such incentives would lead to more effort for less marginal gain. Markers that 
target improvement over time may favor the clinician or team, while changes in 
absolute number may favor the hospital or health network, which typically receives 
and distributes the incentive [4]. 
 
Systems would do well to consider the balance of incentive between the inpatient 
and outpatient settings and between providers and staff. Likewise, markers that target 
improvement over time may favor the physician or team, whereas changes in 
 www.virtualmentor.org Virtual Mentor, June 2013—Vol 15 523 
absolute numbers may favor the hospital or health network that typically receives 
and distributes the incentive [4]. 
 
What Behavior Is Being Incentivized? 
Which behaviors are encouraged by an incentive system are obviously worth 
considering as well. Ethical questions arise if the incentive becomes so strong that it 
creates selection bias within practices. By selection bias we that mean potentially 
noncompliant or simply less healthy patients may be excluded so that the practice 
doesn’t look bad on performance measures. There is some evidence that this 
happened in the National Health Service [5] which created the need for “exception 
reporting” allowing some patients to be left out of the incentive calculation. This was 
also found in Taiwan when there was “cherry-picking” with regard to which patients 
were chosen to be included in the performance tracking for diabetes [6]. In part, the 
success of the health maintenance organization (HMO) model, the system in which 
the provider shares the most risk for cost of care, stems from the fact that most non-
Medicaid HMO patients are working individuals (or their families) with insurance, 
and thus the model excludes many high risk, high complexity patients. In the new 
ACO model, which is close to the HMO model in terms of shared risk and reward, 
team members may become complicit in patient selection bias if they are encouraged 
by strong financial incentives. 
 
There are several solutions to problematic incentives. The Acute Care Episode 
(ACE) demonstration project capped provider bonuses at 25 percent of physicians’ 
Medicare rate so that incentives would not be designed to grow or reduce patient 
volumes but to reward clear cost savings [7]. Another idea is to have some team 
members off any incentive plan, whether that incentive is to share cost savings or 
increase productivity. These team members can then serve as conflict-of-interest 
mediators and be available at the practice or integrated delivery system level. The 
idea is similar to appointing court judges so they can serve without need for 
reelection and are thus less beholden to stakeholders. 
 
More work should be done to consider systems of arbitration that would mediate 
conflicts between those trying to decrease utilization and patients/advocates who feel 
that more care or diagnostic efforts are warranted [8]. Many such issues might be 
avoided by training physicians and educating patients in a shared decision-making 
process. Helping patients understand that the choice to recommend for or against 
testing is based on evidence rather than one doctor’s opinion may lead to evidence-
based care with less resource use and fewer adverse events [9]. Designing insurance 
schemes that motivate patients to both understand and choose value-added care will 
be another ongoing challenge [2]. 
 
Beyond Financial Incentives 
We must also acknowledge that financial incentives are only one factor affecting 
clinician behavior [10]. For an extensive review of the effectiveness of financial 
incentives in changing health care professional behaviors, see the Cochrane Review 
on this topic by Flodgren et al. [11]. Recent qualitative work by Bitton et al. 
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demonstrates both a method to study practice change and some of the impacts noted 
during practice change across multiple settings. Through a series of site visits and 
interviews they explored methods that were used to encourage change, including the 
role of consultants, team and staff restructuring, change fatigue, and the effects of 
compensation changes [12]. They found specific contextual factors in each practice 
that influenced the willingness to change a primary care practice to a patient-
centered home model. In this case change to a PCMH meant shifting from a fee-for-
service model to a capitated payment model that paid both the physicians and care 
team. It would be worthwhile to consider their research questions and methods 
before rolling out an incentive scheme, because the exploration of site-specific 
change barriers may allow for targeted and more successful change efforts. 
 
In another ethnographic approach, Magrath et al. note that monetary and quality 
incentives might crowd out other sources of motivation such as intrinsic motivation, 
might undermine the social relationship with patients, and might have detrimental 
effects on teamwork by fostering competition or envy [13]. Nonfinancial incentives 
might include reward and recognition, but individuals may also be motivated by 
control over lifestyle and work flexibility. At the larger organizational level, 
characteristics such as organizational justice have been correlated with better 
performance [14]. Organizational justice, while manifested by fair policies and 
procedures, is ultimately rooted in ethically sound practice, professionalism, and 
model behavior. Thus, it is best to pay attention to both culture and nonmonetary 
incentives. Effective efforts to improve culture might include leadership 
development, accountability for highly professional behaviors, and fostering a focus 
on the patient. 
 
In the end, the incentives of the U.S. health care system have to change to bring 
about system reform. For better or worse, the primary mechanisms of incentive 
reimbursement in accountable care organizations (ACOs) are likely to include 
bundled payments for episodes of care and pay-for-performance in the near future. 
Bundled payments should reward successful transitions of care efforts and 
appropriate reductions in utilization. Historically, however, capturing the value of 
managing complexity at the individual or practice level has been challenging. 
Utilization risk may force providers to reflect more carefully on care patterns beyond 
the individual patient and consider efforts such as those of the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the U.K. and “Choosing Wisely,” an effort of the 
American Board of Internal Medicine to deter low value practices through 
dissemination of evidence [15]. Already some have shown promising results with 
the ACO model focused on better coordination of care [16]. However, demanding 
accountability from clinicians and care teams when they may be hampered by 
incompletely orchestrated care delivery systems and fragmented electronic health 
records could be disheartening. 
 
In conclusion, incentives and their distribution across the team and care settings must 
be carefully considered. Financial incentives should be considered as just one factor 
in clinician behavior change [10, 17-20]. Incentive targets should be agreed upon by 
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external stakeholders (patients, insurers, employers, and quality and safety leaders) 
and practice stakeholders (physicians, advanced practice clinicians, nurses, staff, and 
community or transitional care coordinators). The team will need education on the 
incentives, with periodic reinforcement and a process for indoctrinating new team 
members during orientation. The team’s performance must be frequently fed back to 
its members and the team should use performance improvement methods to come up 
with collaborative ways to move toward performance goals. 
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